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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure key establishment protocol
that is tailored for Wireless Mesh Networks. The protocol is based on identity-
based key establishment, but without the utilization of a trusted authority for
private key generation. Instead, this task is performed by the collaboration of
mesh nodes; a number of users exceeding a certain threshold form a coalition to
generate private keys for the network users. We performed simulative perfor-
mance evaluation in order to show the effect of both the threshold value and the
network size, i.e., total number of nodes, on the latency of key establishment
and on the success percentage of user private key generation. Results reveal a
trade-off between resiliency and efficiency; increasing the threshold value also
increases the resiliency of the network, but negatively effects its latency and
success percentage. For the threshold values that are smaller than 10 and for
a minimum of 40 mesh nodes, at least 93% of the user private keys can be
computed within at most 2 min. We also discuss the security of our protocol.
We show that our protocol is secure against both outsider malicious and insider
semi-honest adversaries.
Keywords: Wireless Mesh Networks, Key Establishment, Identity-based
Cryptography, Threshold Secret Sharing
IThis work was supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
(TU¨BI˙TAK) under grant 104E071 and part of this work is presented in Q2SWINET 2010 [1].
∗Corresponding author
Preprint submitted to Elsevier
1. Introduction
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [2] are radio frequency based networks,
within which wireless communication is carried out through multihop mesh rout-
ing. They consist of mesh routers and mesh clients, as depicted in Figure 1.
Mesh routers, being stationary, form the backbone of the network and serve as5
routing devices or access points. Mesh clients, being either mobile or station-
ary, are often laptops, cell phones or other such wireless devices with the goal
of connecting the network. They also collaborate to relay the information being
transmitted by the other nodes to improve the network’s coverage. The differ-
ence between these two types of nodes is not only in their mobility, but also10
in their energy consumption constraints. Mesh clients are known to be more
limited in energy as compared to the mesh routers. Therefore, functionalities
that require high computational power and bandwidth can be delegated to the
mesh routers.
WMNs are dynamically self-organized, self-configured and self-healing, mean-15
ing that the network operates in a plug-and-play manner. Furthermore, they
offer both low-cost and high-speed network services for the end users. Along
with the ease of their deployment, WMNs provide mobility, flexibility, high
robustness and increased coverage with an effective level of scalability. Hence,
their utilization is favored, especially in rough and challenging terrains. Example20
areas of WMN usage include health and security surveillance systems, neighbor-
hood and enterprise networking, building automation and transportation [3].
Nevertheless, WMNs are vulnerable to both passive and active attacks by the
very nature of the wireless multihop communication [4]. In a WMN, a passive
attack results in the violation of confidentiality, whereas an active attack further25
compromises authentication, integrity and non-repudiation [2]. Therefore, it is
essential to build a security mechanism for the protection of the exchanged in-
formation. In order to maintain mutual trust and secure communication among
the users, a key establishment service must be provided. It is generally assumed
that the conventional solutions are inapplicable for WMNs due to the energy,30
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storage and bandwidth constraints of the mesh nodes. However, recent research
has shown that implementing asymmetric cryptography in resource constrained
devices can actually be feasible [5, 6, 7, 8].
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Figure 1: Infrastructure of a Wireless Mesh Network
Furthermore, the utilization of Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) in con-
junction with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) found prominent usage in35
that context. The reasons behind this are that IBC eliminates the certificate-
based public key distribution and ECC provides a similar level of security with
RSA [9] for much more smaller key sizes [10, 11, 12]. Hence, EC-IBC (Elliptic
Curve based IBC) reduces both the computation necessary to join the network
and the utilized network bandwidth, considerably. However, the corresponding40
constructions assume the existence of a trusted third party (TTP), by whom the
users’ private keys are generated and distributed. Unfortunately, using TTP in
a security protocol is usually neither rational nor practical because of the fact
that such a system will be prone to single point of failures. Besides, due to
the fact that WMNs are plug-and-play networks by their very nature, security45
should be guaranteed dynamically without any kind of third party intervention.
Hence, the TTP assumption does not fit in the unique characteristics of WMNs,
i.e., being dynamically self-organized, self-configured and self-healing.
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In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient key establishment protocol
(Distributed Key Establishment for Mesh Networks (DKEM)) that is designed50
to cope with the unique characteristics of WMNs. In this solution, EC-IBC
is utilized to decrease the communication and computational complexities of
the proposed protocol. Moreover, the role of the TTP is distributed using
secret sharing in order to increase the resiliency of the network. In DKEM,
the master private key of the network is distributed among the mesh nodes55
using both threshold secret sharing (ThSS) and additive secret sharing (AdSS)
constructions. Our DKEM protocol aims at providing security only for the
operational fragment of WMNs. Hence, the attack models that are specifically
designed for the protocol stack of WMNs are out of the scope of this paper,
and we measure the resiliency of the network only against adversaries that60
physically capture the mesh nodes. Performance evaluation results show that
the threshold value should be increased in order to have a more resilient network
at the expense of higher key establishment latency and lower success percentage
of user private key generation.
1.1. Related Work65
Matsumoto [13], Diffie et al. [14] and Girault [15] propose key establish-
ment schemes that are based on the basic Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
protocol [16], and You and Xie [17] propose a mechanism that is based on the
multi-linear DH key exchange protocol [18]. Each of these schemes adopts a
different approach to bind the exchanged random values to the identities of70
the communicating parties. Besides, both Chatterjee et al. [19] and Shi and
Gong [20] propose approaches to mutually authenticate the nodes with each
other, using the well known ECC constructions. The protocol ISA [21], pro-
posed by Li, utilizes EC-IBC to solve the secure key management problem of
the WMNs. On the other hand, Zhou and Hass [22] propose a key establishment75
protocol that is based on the conventional public key infrastructure, in which a
group of nodes share the role of the Certification Authority (CA) using ThSS. In
their scheme, any k partially server-signed certificates can be used to construct a
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signed certificate that is identical to a CA-signed certificate. Similar approaches
are proposed by Kong et al. [23], in which the RSA certificate signing key is80
distributed among all the nodes of the network, and by Dahshan and Irvine [24],
in which the private key of the central authority, assumed in the ECC construc-
tions, is distributed among a group of nodes. However, in [22, 23, 24], shares of
the certificate signing keys are generated and distributed by the help of a TTP.
Unfortunately, none of the protocols mentioned above is applicable for WMNs85
due to their assumptions on the existence of a trusted server.
One of the approaches to the elimination of the TTP assumption is the uti-
lization of frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS). In this method, nodes
rapidly switch a carrier among many frequency channels and transmit their
data through the channel they are currently using. The constructions rely on90
the fact that the communicating parties will be on the same channel at some
point of time. For instance, Strasser et al. [25] propose to use FHSS to estab-
lish a secret key in the presence of a jammer. Similarly, Miller and Vaidya [26]
utilize FHSS for the establishment of the shared keys by exploiting channel di-
versity to create link keys for the neighbors of the nodes. Alternatively, Zan and95
Gruteser [27] propose a protocol, in which one of the communicating nodes stays
on a randomly selected channel, while the other continuously selects channels
and transmits a pre-key information until the corresponding channels match. In
general, FHSS is utilized for the agreement of the pairwise keys. If the network
in consideration is dense, then the number of channels should be large enough100
to handle collisions. Unfortunately, this negatively affects the performance of
the solution.
Another approach to the elimination of the TTP assumption is the utilization
of secret sharing [4, 28, 29]. For instance, Khalili et al. [4] and Deng et al. [28]
propose to use EC-IBC together with ThSS to manage the cryptographic keys105
within wireless ad hoc networks (WAhNs). These works offer a collaborative
generation of both the secret and its shares, without assuming any trusted
authority. As a result, they enable flexible, efficient and fully distributed key
management for WAhNs. Our DKEM solution is based on the proposal of Deng
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et al. [28], which is described in detail as the baseline protocol in the following110
subsection.
1.2. The Baseline Protocol
The baseline protocol has two phases: (i) distributed key generation phase,
and (ii) identity-based authentication phase. In the former, nodes collaboratively
generate the master key of the network and construct their private keys, while in115
the latter, they authenticate each other and secure their communication using
the keys computed in the first phase.
At the beginning of the first phase, users collaboratively generate their shares
of the master private key. Then, they compute their master public key shares
by simply multiplying their master private key shares with the generator of the120
elliptic curve group, and publish them. As soon as a user receives sufficient
number of master public key shares, it reconstructs the master public key of
the network. Thereafter, each user broadcasts a request message on the shares
of its own private key. Users, receiving such a request message, compute the
corresponding shares by multiplying their own master private key shares with125
the public key of the requester, and transmit them. When the requesting user
receives sufficient number of shares, it reconstructs its own private key.
1.3. Disadvantages of the Baseline Protocol and Roadmap to DKEM
Although the baseline protocol is fully distributed, it has two crucial draw-
backs: (i) large transmission delays, and (ii) the protocol suffers from security130
vulnerabilities. First, the number of users contributing to the master key gen-
eration process directly affects the utilized network bandwidth. If we assume
that n users are in collaboration for the master private key share computations,
then at least (n× (n−1)) packets will be transmitted among them. Thereafter,
these users will publish their master public key shares, which requires another135
n packets to be transmitted. Second, the protocol is not secure against an in-
sider attacker. An insider attacker can obtain the master private key shares of
another node and more importantly, can recover the master private key of the
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system (details in Section 3). Since the attacker is able obtain the secret keys
without physically capturing or compromising any user, the baseline protocol is140
also not resilient.
In DKEM, we address the aforementioned deficiencies of the baseline pro-
tocol by exploiting node hierarchy with respect to both the limitations of the
mesh clients and the provided security level. Since the mesh routers can be
distinguished from the mesh clients by the parameters they hold and by the op-145
erations they perform, we can impose the burden of the master key generation
process on the mesh routers. Moreover, due to the fact that neither the master
public key nor its shares are used among the nodes, we can eliminate the related
computations and communications. These modifications reduce both the num-
ber of nodes present in the master key generation process and the number of150
packets transmitted during this process. In addition, we assume that it is harder
to compromise the mesh routers than compromising the mesh clients. With this
assumption, we can increase the threshold required in a reconstruction process
by increasing the number of shares that the mesh routers hold. Consequently,
the resiliency of the system increases without increasing the number of required155
neighboring nodes as opposed to the baseline protocol, which is shown to be
non-resilient (details in Section 3).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on DKEM.
In Section 3, we analyze the security of both the baseline protocol and our
DKEM protocol. In Section 4, we explore to what extent the network is resilient.160
Section 5 provides the communication, computational and energy complexities
of our DKEM solution and Section 6 evaluates its performance. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2. DKEM: Distributed Key Establishment Protocol for Wireless
Mesh Networks165
We propose Distributed Key Establishment for Mesh Networks (DKEM),
a secure and efficient key establishment protocol that is specifically designed
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for WMNs. In the following subsections, we introduce the assumptions of our
DKEM solution, describe its methodology and present the repeat request after
timeout method, which is proposed to improve the performance of our DKEM170
protocol.
2.1. Assumptions of DKEM
First of all, we assume that the mesh nodes can misbehave or collude with
each other to reveal the private key of any other mesh node only when they
are under attack; if there is no attack, we expect proper behavior. DKEM does175
not rely on the existence of a trusted authority and there is no predefined
mutual trust among the mesh nodes in the sense that a particular node cannot
generate the private key of any other node directly. All of the keys are generated
collaboratively by the mesh routers and distributed accordingly to the mesh
clients. Here, we assume that the mesh nodes will not misbehave on their own180
or conspire with either of the parties unless they are captured by an adversary.
Hence, we measure the resiliency of the network only against adversaries that
physically capture the mesh nodes.
Secondly, we assume that it is harder to compromise the mesh routers than
compromising the mesh clients. Due to the fact that the mesh routers form the185
backbone of WMNs, they should be deployed in such a way that they cover the
network area, so as to maintain continuous connectivity. In other words, mesh
routers must be carefully placed according to a plan. At this point, we assume
that the physical locations of the mesh routers are selected in such a way that
the physical capture of these nodes becomes hard. For example, mesh routers190
can be placed at the top of the street lamps or at the roofs of the properties,
where physical capture requires an effort that is equal to break-in.
Thirdly, we assume that during the key establishment, mesh nodes are au-
thenticated with each other and each can establish an authenticated tunnel with
any of the mesh routers. This assumption is also required by the baseline pro-195
tocol [28]. In the baseline protocol, it is assumed that “When a new node
joins a network, it presents its identity, self-generated temporary public key,
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and some other required physical proof (depending on key issuing policy). To
make sure the generated shares are securely transmitted, the requesting node
may also present its self-generated temporary public key when sending request.”.200
This assumption is relevant in order to prevent the trivial impersonation and
spoofing attacks [30]. Alternatively, the authentication infrastructure can be
accomplished with 802.1x authentication server infrastructure or Blom key pre-
distribution [31, 32] can be used to establish the secure channels. This assump-
tion of authentication and the first assumption above about having no mutual205
trust may seem contradictory. However, they are not contradictory since trust
and authentication are two different security concepts and one can be held with-
out the other.
Fourthly, we assume that the identities of the mesh nodes are unique. As
IBC implies, DKEM utilizes the identities of the mesh nodes as their public keys.210
Therefore, these identities should be unique. In order to easily overcome this
uniqueness issue, the identities of the nodes are selected to be their IP (Inter-
net Protocol) addresses. This can be simply obtained through dynamic address
allocation such as DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), where a cen-
tralized server ensures the uniqueness of the node addresses.215
Finally, we assume that each mesh node has a mechanism to discover its
one hop neighbors and the communication among the mesh nodes is limited
to neighborhood. Any adversary can simply decrease the bandwidth share of
a node by increasing the number of hops in a route between the source and
the destination nodes that a packet will traverse [33, 34]. In order to prevent220
this type of action, and thus to improve the capacity of the network, nodes
should only communicate with their neighbors, as the analytical upper and lower
bounds of a network capacity imply [35]. This is accomplished by broadcasting
messages instead of using unicast messaging unless it is not required.
2.2. Methodology of DKEM225
DKEM consists of three phases: (i) master private key share generation
phase, (ii) master private key share distribution phase, and (iii) user private
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key generation phase. In the first phase, mesh routers collaboratively generate
the shares of the master private key, while in the second phase, these shares are
distributed to the mesh clients. As soon as a mesh client constructs its share230
of the master private key, it can also contribute to the distribution process.
Last phase provides a user private key generation service, by which each mesh
node obtains its own private key. This service is carried out by a collaboration
of a number of mesh nodes. The minimum number of mesh nodes involved in
this process is determined by the level of threat, which depends on the applica-235
tion requirements. Precisely, the level of threat determines a security threshold,
which in turn determines the number of collaborating mesh nodes. For more
details about the selection of the threshold value, one can profitably refer to
Section 4.
In DKEM, we have different levels of trust among the mesh nodes. As
mentioned in Section 2.1, we assume that it is harder to compromise a mesh
router than compromising a mesh client. Accordingly, we can trust mesh routers
more than mesh clients. Hence, we may distribute a larger number of ThSS-
shares to the mesh routers: e.g., if each mesh router holds x shares, then each
mesh client will hold y shares such that x > y. Therefore, the scheme becomes
an (mx+ cy, k)-ThSS, where m is the number of mesh routers, c is the number
of mesh clients and k is the threshold value. However, as mentioned above,
the first phase of DKEM is carried out only by the mesh routers. Hence, the
total number of ThSS-shares present in the system depends only on the number
of mesh routers and the number of shares each holds. Therefore, the ThSS
construction utilized in DKEM becomes (mx, k)-ThSS. Furthermore, we may
also additively share the master private key of the network, r, as defined in
Equation 1, where rm is known by all of the mesh routers and ru is distributed
among the mesh nodes using the approach described above. With this method,
collaboration required for the user private key construction operations includes
a number of mesh nodes providing a total of k shares and a mesh router.
r = rm + ru (mod q) (1)
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Symbols used in the protocol definition are listed in Table 1. Throughout240
the paper, a value with a capital letter (except the abbreviations for entities M,
C and U) represents a point on the elliptic curve. In Appendix A, we present
some example network settings of our DKEM protocol.
2.2.1. Master Private Key Share Generation Phase
The first phase of DKEM is the master private key share generation phase,245
in which the mesh routers collaboratively generate the shares of the master
private key. It starts with the mesh routers deciding on the global parameters
of the elliptic curve cryptosystem and the threshold value to be utilized. The
upcoming operations performed by the mesh routers are given in Algorithm 1.
First of all, each mesh router Mi selects x secrets ti, z and x polynomi-
als fi, z(a) of degree (k − 1) over Fq such that fi, z(0) = ti, z, where 1 ≤
z ≤ x (Step 3). Secondly, each of them computes the subshares of the mas-
ter private key, σj, i, z, by evaluating the generated polynomials for each mesh
router (Step 5), and exchanges these information with their correspondents (Step 7).
Finally, when mesh router Mi receives ((m − 1) × x) subshares of the master
private key, it computes its master private key shares, γi, z, using Equation 2
(Step 13).
γi, z =
m∑
j=1
σi, j, z (mod q) 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ z ≤ x (2)
As soon as a mesh router computes its shares of the master private key, it250
broadcasts a message that indicates the end of the first phase (Step 15). This
message will be referred as ”FINISH message ” hereafter.
In Appendix A, Figure A.9 depicts an illustration for the master private key
share generation phase of DKEM.
2.2.2. Master Private Key Share Distribution Phase255
The second phase of DKEM is the master private key share distribution
phase, in which the shares of the master private key are distributed to the mesh
clients. The procedures followed by the mesh nodes are given in Algorithm 2.
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Table 1: Symbols used in DKEM Protocol Definition
Symbol Description
Ui i
th user
Mi i
th mesh router
Ci i
th mesh client
m Number of mesh routers
c Number of mesh clients
x Number of shares for Mi for ThSS
y Number of shares for Ci for ThSS
k Threshold value of ThSS
Bi User public key of Ui
Vi User private key of Ui
r Master private key of the network
rm Additive share of r, owned only by Mi
ru Additive share of r, threshold-wise shared among Ui
γi, z z
th share of ru owned by Ui
` Total number of computed γi, z for Ui
σi, j, z z
th subshare of ru generated by Mj for Mi
ρi, j Partial share of r
u generated by Uj for Ui
Γui, j, z z
th share of Vi generated by Uj using r
u
Γmi, j Share of Vi generated by Mj using r
m
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Algorithm 1 Master Private Key Share Generation
1: procedure Phase 1: Mesh Router Mi (m, x, k)
2: for all z ∈ {1, ..., x} do
3: select ti, z & fi, z(a)
4: for all j ∈ {1, ..., m} do
5: compute σj, i, z
6: if j 6= i then
7: transmit σj, i, z to Mj
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: if ((m− 1)× x) σi, j, z’s received then
12: for all z ∈ {1, ..., x} do
13: compute γi, z
14: end for
15: broadcast FINISH
16: end if
17: end procedure
When mesh client Ci receives a FINISH message from one of its neighbors,
it broadcasts a request message on its master private key share (Step 14). Mesh260
node Uj , receiving this request message, can contribute to the distribution pro-
cess if and only if it has already computed its (at least two) shares of the master
private key. If this is the case, then the mesh node Uj transmits a message
to the mesh client Ci that includes the number of shares it can contribute
with (Steps 3, 23, and 27). Otherwise, mesh node Uj saves this request in order265
to handle it after computing its master private key share(s) (Steps 5 and 29).
When mesh client Ci receives a number of replies that indicates a total
contribution of at least k partial shares, it randomly selects sufficient number
of contributing mesh nodes, and broadcasts another message indicating the
selected nodes that will contribute to the distribution operation (Step 18). Upon270
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Algorithm 2 Master Private Key Share Distribution
1: procedure Phase 2: Mesh Router Mj (x)
2: if share request by Ci & γi, x is computed then
3: transmit a contribution reply to Ci
4: else if share request by Ci then
5: save request
6: else if contribution required by Ci then
7: compute ρi, j
8: transmit ρi, j to Ci
9: end if
10: end procedure
11: procedure Phase 2: Mesh Client Ci (x, k)
12: `← 1
13: if FINISH message received for the first time then
14: broadcast share request
15: else if y > 1 & ` < y & γi, `−1 is computed then
16: broadcast share request
17: else if sufficient contributions received then
18: broadcast share request with contributors
19: else if k ρi, j ’s received then
20: compute γi, `
21: `← `+ 1
22: for all saved share requests from Cj do
23: transmit a contribution reply to Cj
24: end for
25: else if share request by Cj then
26: if ` > 1 & γi, `−1 is computed then
27: transmit a contribution reply to Cj
28: else
29: save request
30: end if
31: else if contribution required by Cj then
32: compute ρj, i
33: transmit ρj, i to Cj
34: end if
35: end procedure
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receipt of this second request message, if mesh node Uj recognizes that its
contribution is not required, then it simply discards this message. Otherwise,
it computes the master private key partial share of the mesh client Ci, ρi, j ,
via Equation 3, where lj, z(i, `) is the Lagrange basis polynomial and ` is the
number of computed master private key shares (Steps 7 and 32).
ρi, j =
∑
z
γj, z × lj, z(i, `) (mod q)

1 ≤ z ≤ y Uj = Cj
1 ≤ z ≤ x Uj = Mj
(3)
Thereafter, mesh node Uj transmits the computed partial share to mesh
client Ci (Steps 8 and 33). When mesh client Ci receives a total of k partial
shares, it computes its master private key share by simply adding up all the
received data, as given in Equation 4 (Step 20). If y > 1, after computing
their first master private key shares, i.e., ` = 1, mesh clients broadcast another
request message on their second master private key shares, i.e., ` = 2, and this
procedure is repeated until all y master private key shares are computed, i.e.,
` = y (Step 16).
γi, z =
∑
j
ρi, j (mod q) 1 ≤ z ≤ ` (4)
In Appendix A, Figure A.10 depicts an illustration for the master private
key share distribution phase of DKEM.
2.2.3. User Private Key Generation Phase
The last phase of DKEM is the user private key generation phase, in which
each mesh node constructs its own private key with the collaboration of the275
other mesh nodes. The operations performed by the mesh nodes are given in
Algorithm 3.
After mesh node Ui finishes computing its share(s) of the master private
key, it broadcasts a request message on the construction of its own private
key (Step 8). Another mesh node Uj , receiving this request message, can con-280
tribute to the user private key generation process if and only if it has already
computed its share(s) of the master private key. Otherwise, it will save this re-
quest in order to handle it once it has its master private key share(s) (Step 26).
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Algorithm 3 User Private Key Generation Phase
1: procedure Phase 3: Mesh Node Ui (x, y, k)
2: if Ui is a mesh router then
3: e← x
4: else if Ui is a mesh client then
5: e← y
6: end if
7: if γi, z is computed then
8: broadcast share request message
9: else if sufficient contributions received then
10: broadcast share request with contributors
11: else if request by Uj and γi, 1 is computed then
12: transmit a contribution reply to Uj
13: else if (k − e) Γui, j, z’s received then
14: compute Vi
15: else if contribution required with p shares then
16: if γi, z is computed then
17: for all z ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
18: compute Γuj, i, z
19: transmit Γuj, i, z to Uj
20: end for
21: if additive share requested then
22: compute Γmj, i
23: transmit Γmj, i
24: end if
25: else
26: save request
27: end if
28: end if
29: end procedure
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If the mesh node Uj has already computed its share(s) of the master private
key, then it transmits a message to the requesting mesh node Ui that includes285
the number of shares it can contribute with (Steps 12).
When mesh node Ui receives a number of replies that indicates a total con-
tribution of (k − x) or (k − y) user private key shares, depending on being a
mesh router or a mesh client, respectively, it randomly selects sufficient number
of contributing mesh nodes. If the requesting mesh node Ui is a mesh client,290
one of these contributing mesh nodes must be a mesh router due to the fact
that the additive share of its user private key can only be provided by a mesh
router. Since the mesh routers are arranged specifically so as to cover the net-
work area, as discussed in Section 2.1, at least one mesh router will be in the
communication range of the requesting mesh client. Hence, this additional share295
will always be received. On the other hand, if the requesting mesh node Ui is a
mesh router, then it can compute this additional share by itself.
Thereafter, mesh node Ui broadcasts another request message indicating the
selected nodes that will contribute to the user private key generation process,
specifying the mesh router that will also contribute with the additive share of its300
user private key (Step 10). Upon receipt of this second request message, if mesh
node Uj recognizes that its contribution is not required, it simply discards the
message. Otherwise, it computes the user private key share(s) of the requesting
mesh node Ui, Γ
u
i, j, z, using Equation 5, where Bi is the public key of the mesh
node Ui (Step 18). If the mesh node Uj is the mesh router from which the305
mesh node Ui requested the additive share of its user private key, then it also
computes this additional share using Equation 6 (Step 22).
Γui, j, z = γj, z ×Bi
 1 ≤ z ≤ y if Uj = Cj1 ≤ z ≤ x if Uj = Mj (5)
Γmi, j = r
m ×Bi (6)
After that, mesh node Uj delivers the computed user private key share(s)
to the mesh node Ui (Step 19 and 23). As soon as the requesting mesh node
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Ui receives all of the required data, it constructs its own private key using310
Equation 7, where lj, z(i) is the Lagrange basis polynomial (Step 14).
Vi = Γ
m
i, j +
t1∑
j=1
t2∑
z=1
Γui, j, z × lj, z(i)

t1 × t2 = k
t1: collaborators
t2: provided shares
(7)
In Appendix A, Figure A.11 depicts an example scenario for the user private
key generation phase of DKEM.
2.3. Repeat Request After Timeout
DKEM necessitates collaboration of mesh nodes during the computations315
in its last two phases. In the second phase, master private key shares are
collaboratively distributed to the mesh clients, while in the last phase, mesh
nodes generate their private keys with the contribution of the other mesh nodes.
These constructions require request messages to be broadcast. Therefore, if a
requesting mesh node does not have sufficient number of neighbors that can320
contribute with a total of k shares, where k is the threshold value, it simply
cannot complete these phases since the corresponding requests cannot provide
it with sufficient number of shares for the required computations. However,
a request message may also drop due to collisions. As a result, the requesting
mesh node cannot compute either of the related keys in spite of having sufficient325
number of neighbors.
This problem cannot be resolved using a MAC (Medium Access Control)
layer mechanism because of the facts that the corresponding messages are broad-
cast messages and they are not retransmitted. In order to overcome collision
based packet drops of the request messages, DKEM adopts repeat request after330
time-out method. In this method, each of the requesting mesh nodes sets a
timer associated with their requests, just after transmitting them. If a request-
ing mesh node cannot receive all of the required data within a predefined time
interval, it retransmits its request message and sets another timer associated
with this retransmitted-request. Mesh nodes retransmit their request messages335
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only for a predefined number of times to avoid indefinite message retransmis-
sions in case that they may not have enough neighbors to provide them with
sufficient number of shares for the requested operation. In our implementations,
mesh nodes wait for 3 sec to repeat their requests and they retransmit their re-
quest messages at most 10 times. We determined these values via simulation340
over various values to optimize the performance of our solutions with respect to
both key establishment latency and successful user private key generation rate.
3. Security Analysis of Baseline and DKEM Protocols
A WMN may come under attack from both outsider and insider attackers.
Outsider attackers are limited to attacking the network without having access to345
the network resources; this includes eavesdropping, injection, modification, and
replay of packets. Insider attackers, having obtained access to authentication
material (e.g., cryptographic keys), can pose as authorized participants and
attack the network from the inside. Insider attackers are either nodes that have
been compromised or honest nodes that have turned malicious.350
The outsider attacker could be either passive or active, but for the insider
attacker, we consider the semi-honest type adversary, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Semi-Honest Party). A Semi-Honest Party (a.k.a. honest-but-
curious party) is an insider attacker that properly follows the prescribed actions
of the protocol, but can keep a record of all its intermediate communications and355
analyze in order to deduce some additional knowledge about the other entities’
private information sets.
In this model, the insider attacker adheres to the predefined protocol steps in
order to remain undetectable. This assumption is relevant because considering
a WMN, the sustainability of the system is based on trustworthiness of the360
entities, and detecting any malicious behavior is not tolerated and may result
in a ban.
For a key establishment protocol, the most worrying attack that should be
prevented is revealing the secret key of an entity or the system by either outsider
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or insider attacker since the key establishment is done on the wireless environ-365
ment. In this section, we first discuss the security of the baseline protocol
proposed by Deng et al. [28]. We show that the baseline protocol is not secure
against a semi-honest insider attacker. We prove that the attacker can obtain
master private shares of other nodes and more crucially, can obtain the master
private key of the system results in compromising the system completely. There-370
after, we show that our protocol is secure against both outsider and semi-honest
insider adversaries.
3.1. Security Analysis of Baseline Protocol
We keep the same notation used in the original paper [28], in order to avoid
any confusion with DKEM protocol.375
Theorem 3.1. Considering the protocol defined in [28], a semi-honest node can
obtain a master private share of another mesh node.
Proof. Let Cp be a semi-honest node that wants to generate its share of the
master private key and let Ci be another node that contributes to this process
by computing the partial share of the node Cp as in Equation 8, where li(p) =380 ∏k
j∈G, j 6=i
p−j
i−j and G is the set of the contributors. Ci sends the subshare si, p
to Cp.
si, p = Si × li(p) (mod q) (8)
At this point, Cp should not recover the secret share Si from this subshare.
However, Cp can easily compute li(p), which is a publicly known value, and it
obtains the secret share of Ci as in Equation 9, where a
−1 mod q denotes the385
multiplicative inverse of a in mod q.
Si = si, p × li(p)−1 (mod q) (9)
Therefore, a semi-honest client can obtain the master private key share of a
mesh router.
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Theorem 3.2. A semi-honest client Cp can obtain the master secret of the
system and can compute all the mesh nodes’ private keys.390
Proof. As a result of Theorem 3.1, a semi-honest client can compute the master
secret of the system by collecting k number of subshares from other nodes and
obtain the master private key of the system, SKM , given in Equation 10, where
k − 1 is the degree of the secret polynomial and SKM is the master private key
of the system.395
SKM =
k∑
i=1
Si × li(0) (mod q) (10)
Hence, Cp can compute the private key of any mesh node by sk
j = SKM×QjID,
where skj and QjID are the secret and the public key of node j respectively.
Note that, since the attacker is able to obtain the secret keys without phys-
ically capturing or compromising any user, the baseline protocol is also not
resilient. Therefore in Section 4 we do not examine the resiliency of the baseline400
protocol.
3.2. Security Analysis of DKEM Protocol
The security goals of our DKEM protocol are providing secret data confi-
dentiality from both outsider (both passive and active) and semi-honest insider
adversaries. We assume that q is a large prime, thus the probability of guessing405
an arbitrary number over the finite field Fq is negligible. In what follows, we
examine the security of the DKEM protocol and show that our constructions
are secure in the semi-honest model.
Theorem 3.3. Considering the first phase of the DKEM protocol, an outsider
attacker Ao can obtain a mesh router’s master private key share with a negligible410
probability.
Proof. Let there be m mesh routers in the system, and let x be the num-
ber of shares that a mesh router holds. Besides, let assume Ao can observe
all of the interactions among the mesh routers. So, Ao learns the values of
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σi,j,z, ∀i, j with i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, and ∀z with 1 ≤ z ≤ x. If415
i′ ∈R {1, . . . ,m} and z′ ∈R {1, . . . , x}. In order to calculate the value of
γi′,z′ = F (σi′,1,z′ , . . . , σi′,i′,z′ , . . . , σi′,m,z′), the adversary has to figure out the
value of σi′,i′,z′ . However, the distribution of σ is uniform, thus the success
probability of Ao is 1|q| which is negligible. Since i′ and z′ are arbitrary, this
argument holds for any master private key share.420
Theorem 3.4. Considering the first phase of DKEM protocol, an insider semi-
honest attacker can obtain a mesh router’s master private key share with a
negligible probability.
Proof. There are two types of attackers to consider: (i) a semi-honest router,
and (ii) a semi-honest client.425
(i) Let Ms be a semi-honest mesh router. Note that, the only advantage of
Ms over Ao is the knowledge of the values σi,s,z, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ z ≤ x. However, Ms still needs to calculate the values of γi,z for i 6= s.
As indicated above, for any fixed i′ and z′, the success probability of the
attacker is 1|q| , which is negligible.430
(ii) It is obvious that a semi-honest mesh router is more powerful than a semi-
honest client Cs. Thus, a semi-honest mash node cannot either obtain
mesh router’s master private key share.
Theorem 3.5. Considering the second phase of DKEM protocol, a semi-honest435
client Cs can obtain a master private key share of another mesh node with a
negligible probability.
Proof. There are two cases to consider: A semi-honest mesh client try to obtain
(i) master private key share of another mesh router (Mi), or (ii) master private
key share of another mesh client (Ci).440
(i) Let Cs be a semi-honest client that wants to generate its master private key
share according to Algorithm 2. Let Mi be a mesh router that contributes
22
to this process by computing the z-th master private key partial share of
the mesh client Cs via Equation 11, where li,j(s) =
∏k
j∈G, j 6=i
s−j
i−j and G
is the set of the contributors.445 ∑
1<z≤x
ρs, i, z =
∑
z≤x
γi, zli,j(s) (mod q) (11)
Mi sends this sum of subshares to Cs. In order to complete the proof, we
have to show two sub-cases such that (a) Cs cannot not recover any single
secret share γi, z and (b) Cs cannot compute any other point in the secret
polynomial.
(a) The problem is equivalent to solving linear equations with z-unknowns,450
where 1 < z ≤ x. Since in this case there is only one equation, the
solution is infeasible. Therefore, Cs cannot obtain any γi, z value.
(b) Cs cannot compute any other point in the secret polynomial, i.e.,
fi(a) for ∀a ≥ 0 such that a 6= s. Since Equation 11 is calculated
using li,j(s) with different j values and from the first sub-case (a)455
Cs cannot obtain any γi, z, it cannot compute any other point in the
secret polynomial fi(a).
(ii) It is easy to see that the above mentioned reasoning also works when the
contributor is a mesh client (Ci). The sum of subshares calculation is
similar as in Equation 11 for z = 2. Therefore, a semi-honest mesh client460
cannot obtain master private key share of another mesh client (Ci).
Note that, considering the second phase of the DKEM protocol, a mesh
node Uj can contribute to the share generation process of a mesh client Ci if
it has at least two master private key shares. The partial share is computed465
by summing the shares as given in the Equation 11. Uj can provide more
than one partial shares if and only if the provided linear equations ensure an
underdetermined linear system (i.e. the unknowns outnumber the number of
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linearly independent equations). Otherwise, providing a set of equations that is
linearly solvable simply reveals Uj ’s shares.470
Theorem 3.6. Considering the third phase of the DKEM protocol, a semi-
honest node Us cannot obtain a master private key share of another mesh node.
Proof. Let Uj be a node that contributes for the secret key generation of the
mesh node Us. Using Equation 12, Uj computes the following share.
Γus, j, z = γj, z ×Bs
 1 ≤ z ≤ y if Uj = Cj1 ≤ z ≤ x if Uj = Mj (12)
Obtaining γj, z from the above equation is equivalent to solving the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The same security reduction is
also applicable for the case of computing Γmi, j = r
m×Bi. Furthermore, obtaining475
any number of these shares from other users does not provide an additional
advantage to the attacker.
4. Resiliency Analysis of DKEM
Resiliency of a network is defined as the maximum number of compromised
nodes for which the security of the network is not affected. As described in480
Section 2.2, DKEM uses AdSS, in which one of the additively shared secrets
is known by all of the mesh routers and the other one is shared among the
mesh nodes using (mx, k)-ThSS, where m is the number of mesh routers, x
is the number of shares each holds and k is the number of shares required for
the reconstruction processes. In this scheme, the generated master private key485
shares are distributed to the mesh clients in such a way that each mesh client
holds at most y shares, where y < x. Our scheme ensures that a mesh router will
always contribute to the construction of a user private key. Hence, an adversary
must capture at least one mesh router in order for him to be successful. In other
words, as long as a mesh router is not compromised, no matter how many mesh490
clients are captured, the resiliency of the network is conserved.
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Although being harder than compromising a mesh client (as mentioned in
Section 2.1), if at least one mesh router is compromised, then the resiliency
of the network depends on the total number of captured shares. In this case,
collaborations among the captured mesh nodes, which aim at obtaining the495
shares of any other mesh node, should also be taken into account.
Let assume an adversary compromises a ≥ 1 mesh routers and b mesh clients.
The number of directly captured shares is (ax + by). On the other hand, the
number of indirectly captured shares depends on obtaining a set of equations (in
the form of Equation 3) that are linearly solvable. In this context, the resiliency
of the network is preserved when the system satisfies Equation 13, where E is
the expected number of indirectly captured shares.
k > ax+ by + E (a ≥ 1) (13)
In order to show how E varies with respect to the number of compromised
nodes, we implemented a simulator. We make the following basic assumptions
in order to model our simulator: (i) partial shares of clients are transmitted
by summing up two master private key shares (in the form of Equation 3), (ii)500
a client obtains each share pair from a uniformly random selected router. For
the second assumption, in real case, the share transmission may depend on the
geographic distribution of the nodes and the communication ranges. However,
this assumption is relevant when the clients are mobile or the communication
range is long enough.505
Now we describe how our simulator works. After the mesh routers obtain
their master private key shares, each client receives their master private key
shares from a set of routers selected uniformly random. A router can provide
more than one equation to the same client given that none of the single shares
are common among the provided equations. After that, the simulator randomly510
selects a given number of nodes to be compromised and then extracts the in-
directly captured shares. In order to find the indirectly captured shares, the
simulator uses a graph theoretical approach. For each mesh router, the simula-
tor constructs an undirected and unweighted graph (in total, m graphs), such
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that each vertex represents a master private key share of the router. Simulator515
generates an edge between two verticies if the corresponding shares are provided
to a client with an equation. In each graph, the simulator checks for a cycle
through the corrupted edges (equations) of the compromised clients. If a cycle
is found, the vertices on that cycle are marked. Finding a cycle means that the
shares on the cycle can be captured by solving the linear equations. In addition,520
the vertices that are directly connected to a captured vertex are also marked as
captured. This is because of the fact that if the attacker has an equation (orig-
inally with two unknowns) and one of the unknown is captured, then the other
unknown can be easily found. In the resulting graph, the marked vertices yield
the number of indirectly captured shares for a mesh router. The total number of525
indirectly captured shares is equivalent to the total number of marked vertices
for all routers.
Figure 2 depicts the results of simulations comparing the number of compro-
mised clients (i.e. b) versus the expected number of indirectly captured shares
(i.e. E). We run the experiments for the combinations of the following param-530
eters: the number of mesh routers: 25 and 50; the number of master private
key share of routers: 4, 8 and 16; the number of master private key share of
clients: 2. Note that compromising clients are easier than compromising routers
therefore minimizing the number of client share is reasonable. Therefore we fix
the number of client share to the minimum number of 2, since doubling both535
the number of client share and router share is not meaningful. For each given
number of compromised clients (in x axis), the experiments are run for 10.000
times and the expected numbers of indirectly captured shares are calculated by
taking the average.
In Figure 2, the results show that the number of indirectly captured shares540
decreases as the number of routers increases. This is because of the fact that
when there are more supplier routers, clients can receive their shares from more
alternative routers. Note that the number of graphs in the simulator is equiva-
lent to the the number of routers. Thus increasing the number of routers also
increases the total number of graphs. Assuming a uniformly distributed system,545
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Figure 2: Number of compromised clients vs. the expected number of indirectly
captured shares for different m, x and y value combinations. Considering each
number of compromised clients, the experiment is run for 10, 000 times and
the result is calculated by taking the averages.
this will decrease the probability of having a cycle for a given graph. Similarly
the number of indirectly captured shares is inversely proportional to the number
of router share. Considering our simulator, the number of vertices in each graph
increases as number of shares to be distributed increases. Therefore, this causes
a decrease in the probability of having a cycle in a more sparse graph.550
One another important result of Figure 2 is that the expected number of
indirectly captured shares is relatively small comparing the directly captured
shares. According to the first (and worst) setting (i.e. m = 25, x = 4, y = 2),
for example, after compromising 15 clients the adversary obtains 32 shares in
total; 30 of them are directly captured (i.e., each client has 2 master private key555
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shares 15× 2 = 30) and only 2 of them are indirectly captured. Therefore, the
number of indirectly captured shares is limited as compared to the number of
directly captured shares. Thus we conclude that the resiliency of DKEM mostly
depends on the number of physical corruptions.
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Figure 3: Mesh router capture percentage vs. threshold parameter for different
b, x, y combinations
Figure 3 depicts mesh router capture percentage versus the required thresh-560
old value using the inequality k > ax + by + E given in Equation 13. We con-
sider various numbers of corrupted clients (b = 0, 5, 10) and number of shares
(x = 8, y = 2 and x = 4, y = 2). Here the number of mesh routers is taken as
25. Each line is linear; this is expected because of the linearity of Equation 13.
Note that DKEM ensures that as long as a mesh router is not compromised,565
no matter how many mesh clients are captured, the resiliency of the network
is preserved. Furthermore, according to assumption mentioned in Section 2.1,
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it is assumed that capturing a mesh router is much harder than capturing a
mesh client. Hence, in a typical system, a router has more shares than a client.
Therefore, if the number of captured routers increases, the total number of570
shares compromised also increases dramatically, depending on the value of x.
This, in turn, causes higher threshold values. For a system that has a high
risk of attack, the threshold value should be selected as high accordingly; the
consequences of this are discussed in Section 6.1.
5. Communication, Computational and Energy Overhead of DKEM575
and the Baseline Protocol
Both DKEM and the baseline protocol incur communication overhead in all
of their phases, whereby the first phases dominate the others. The computa-
tional overhead of DKEM is introduced by the utilization of EC-IBC, AdSS and
ThSS, while the computational overhead of the baseline protocol is introduced580
by the utilization of EC-IBC and ThSS. In the following subsections we com-
paratively examine the communication, computational and energy overhead of
DKEM and the baseline protocol.
5.1. Communication Overhead of DKEM and the Baseline Protocol
In DKEM, the master private key of the network is generated collaboratively585
to eliminate the TTP assumptions of both IBC and secret sharing constructions.
As described in Section 2.2.1, in the first phase of DKEM, the shares of the
master private key are generated with the contribution of all the mesh routers.
This process requires (m×(m−1)) unicast messages to be transmitted, where m
is the number of mesh routers. In the last two phases of DKEM, the number of590
transmitted packets are affected only by the number of the mesh nodes that have
already computed their master private key shares. Nevertheless, none of those
operations introduces larger amount of packet transmissions as compared to that
of the first phase. Besides, the sizes of all message payloads are approximately
the same with each other. Hence, the communication overhead introduced by595
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the message transfers in the last two phases are negligible. As a consequence,
the communication complexity of DKEM is O(m2), in terms of the number of
packets transmitted.
In the baseline protocol, the communication overhead of generating the
shares of the master private key is far more than the communication over-600
head of the upcoming operations performed in the first phase. In other words,
analogous to that of DKEM, the communication overhead introduced by the
message transfers after the master private key share generation process is neg-
ligible. On the other hand, as described in Section 1.2, this specific process
requires (n× (n− 1)) unicast messages to be transmitted, where n is the num-605
ber of mesh nodes. Consequently, the communication complexity of the baseline
protocol becomes O(n2), in terms of the number of packets transmitted. In this
regard, we can state that the communication complexity of the baseline protocol
is greater than the communication complexity of DKEM, considering the fact
that n > m.610
5.2. Computational Overhead of DKEM and the Baseline Protocol
In the first phase of DKEM, mesh routers collaboratively generate the shares
of the master private key. They start with computing the corresponding sub-
shares, which includes ((m+ 1)× x× (k− 1)) modular additions and (m× k×
(k−1)/2) modular multiplications, where m is the number of mesh routers, x is615
the number of shares each holds and k is the threshold value. Then, after receiv-
ing all of the relevant data, they perform another modular addition of (m× x)
values to compute their shares of the master private key. In the second phase
of DKEM, these shares are distributed to the mesh clients. The corresponding
partial shares are computed using k modular multiplications and k modular ad-620
ditions. When a mesh client receives k subshares, it computes its master private
key share after (3k × (k − 1)) modular multiplications, (k × (k − 1)) modular
inverse operations, k elliptic curve (EC) scalar point multiplications and k EC
point additions. All of the second phase operations are performed at most y
times, where y is the number of shares each mesh client holds. Finally, in the625
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last phase of DKEM, mesh nodes construct their own private keys. Mesh routers
compute user private key ThSS-shares using x EC scalar point multiplications,
while mesh clients compute such shares using at most y EC scalar point multi-
plications. Besides, mesh routers compute the additional share for the requested
user private key using (x+ 1) EC scalar point multiplications. Moreover, mesh630
nodes compute their private keys using at most (3k × x × (k − 1)) modular
multiplications, (k× x× (k− 1)) modular inverse operations, (k× x) EC scalar
point multiplications and (k × x+ 1) EC point additions.
On the other hand, in the baseline protocol, which is described in Section 1.2,
nodes perform ((n + 1) × (k − 1)) modular additions and (n × k × (k − 1)/2)635
modular multiplications to compute their subshares, where n is the total number
of nodes within the system. After that, each performs another modular addition
of n values to compute their shares of the master private key. Then, each node
computes their share of the master public key using one EC point multiplication
and reconstructs the actual value of the master public key using n EC point640
additions. Thereafter, nodes construct their own private keys using at most
(3k× (k−1)) modular multiplications, (k× (k−1)) modular inverse operations,
(k + 1) EC scalar point multiplications and (k + 1) EC point additions.
Table 2 gives the computational overhead of DKEM and the baseline protocol
in terms of the types and the numbers of operations performed by each of the645
nodes. In this table, c is the number of mesh clients and p is the number of
mesh clients that the mesh routers help.
5.3. Energy Overhead of DKEM and the Baseline Protocol
In order to calculate the energy consumed by the nodes of DKEM and the
baseline protocol, we have made a number of assumptions and used relevant650
information provided in the literature, as detailed below. In brief, we have
reduced the field and EC point operations into field multiplication operations
and assuming 256-bit security, we have approximated the energy consumed by
the nodes of the network, given specific values for the number of nodes and the
number of shares hold by each of these nodes.655
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Table 2: Computational Overhead of DKEM and the Baseline Protocol
DKEM
Baseline Protocol
Mesh Router Mesh Client
Modular x(k(m+ 1)− 1)
k(cy − p) k(n+ 1)− 1
Addition + pk
Modular 3kx(k − 1) + kp k(cy − p)
k(k − 1)(3 + n/2)
Multiplication + mk(k − 1)/2 + 3k(k − 1)(x+ y)
Modular
kx(k − 1) k(k − 1)(x+ y) k(k − 1)
Inverse
EC Point
kx+ 1 kx+ 1 n+ k + 1
Addition
EC Point
x(k + 2) + 1 kx+ y k + 2
Multiplication
Using Modified Jacobian Coordinates, an EC doubling operation is equiva-
lent to 4 field multiplication and 4 field squaring operations, while an EC point
addition operation is equivalent to 9 field multiplication and 5 field squaring op-
erations [36]. At this point, we assume that a squaring operation is equivalent to
a multiplication operation in field arithmetic, for the sake of simplicity. Besides,660
we further assume that the total cost of modular addition and EC point addi-
tion operations are negligible as compared to the cost of all the other operations.
Under these circumstances, from computational point of view, we can reduce
each one of the modular exponentiation, modular inverse and EC point mul-
tiplication operations (without side-channel protection) into a certain number665
of modular multiplication operations. In this regard, a modular exponentia-
tion would correspond to 3b modular multiplications, a modular inverse would
correspond to 3b modular multiplications (due to Fermat’s little theorem [37]),
and a EC point multiplication would correspond to 30b modular multiplications,
providing b-bit security.670
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Considering 256-bit security, mesh routers and mesh clients in DKEM, and
the nodes in the baseline protocol perform approximately 37k2+83k, 36k2+234k
and 56k2 − 26k field multiplications, respectively, with the following network
specifications: m = 25, c = 75, n = 100, x = 4 and y = 2, where k is the
threshold value. Having regard to the appraised values provided in [38] and [39],675
each one of the mesh routers and mesh clients in DKEM, and the nodes in the
baseline protocol consume approximately (384k2+863k)nJ , (374k2+2434k)nJ
and (582k2 − 270k)nJ of energy, respectively. At this point, we can conclude
that the nodes in DKEM consume less energy as compared to the nodes in
the baseline protocol, as proposed by the lower coefficients of k2, although the680
energy consumption complexity of both DKEM and the baseline protocol are
O(k2). Furthermore, the communication complexity of DKEM is preferable as
discussed in Section 5.1 and the baseline protocol is not secure as discussed in
Section 3.1.
6. Performance Evaluation of DKEM685
We analyzed the performance of our DKEM protocol using Network Simula-
tor 2 (ns2) [40] version 2.35. For simulation scenarios, we modeled the network
as having n = 40, 60, 80, 100 nodes within 2000 × 2000 square meters. Our
network model includes 25 mesh routers, i.e., m = 25, that are deployed in
gradual manner. In this deployment model, each mesh router is in the trans-690
mission range of its neighboring mesh routers. Additionally, each of them has
4 shares of the master private key, i.e., x = 4. On the other hand, mesh clients
are deployed within the network area using bivariate uniform random distribu-
tion, and each holds at most 2 shares of the master private key, i.e., y = 2.
Besides, we simulated the performance of our network for the threshold values695
k ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16}.
All of the simulations are run on a personal computer with the following
configuration: Windows 8 (64-bit), Intel Core 2 Duo Quad CPU Processor
at 2.40 GHz, 4 GB RAM and GCC 4.3.3 on Cygwin 2.859. In addition, we
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used MAC and network interface types of 802.11p [41], omni-directional an-700
tenna with 375 meter transmission range, priority queue defined under drop
tail queue, DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector) routing and TCP
(Transmission Control Protocol). Besides, we used EC-IBC implementation
provided by MIRACL (Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++
Library) [42]. In this implementation, the non-singular elliptic curve is defined705
a ” y2 = x3 + 1 mod (p) ” and the cryptographic curve parameters have the
following properties: (i) p mod 3 = 2, (ii) p mod 8 = 3, (iii) q is a prime factor
of (p+ 1), (iv) q > 3, and (v) q = 2159 + 217 + 1.
In order to evaluate the performance of our DKEM solution, we consider
two metrics: (i) key establishment latency, and (ii) success percentage of user710
private key generation. Our first metric is defined as the elapsed time between
the initial deployment and the final user private key computation. Our second
metric is the ratio of the number of mesh nodes that have computed their own
private keys to the network size.
The following subsections include discussions on the performance results of715
our DKEM protocol with respect to the defined metrics, and a comparison of
those results with the respective evaluation results of the baseline protocol.
6.1. Key Establishment Latency
We evaluated the key establishment latency of DKEM, i.e., time elapsed
between the start of the first phase and the end of the last phase, for different720
values of both the network size, n, and the threshold value, k. Figure 4 shows
the corresponding results.
In the last two phases of DKEM, in which the master private key shares
are distributed and the user private keys are generated, communication among
the mesh nodes includes request messages, as described in Sections 2.2.2 and725
2.2.3, respectively. As also discussed in Section 2.3, to handle collision based
packet drops, mesh nodes adopt a repeat request after timeout method, by the
use of which requests are repeated. When the threshold value increases, the
probability of having sufficient number of neighbors decreases. Accordingly, the
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Figure 4: Key Establishment Latency in DKEM
probability of receiving sufficient number of shares for a specific construction730
operation decreases. Hence, the adopted method becomes favorable, in spite
of not having sufficient number of neighbors. In other words, the requesting
mesh node assumes that its request message has collided with another request
message and repeats its request. As a result, key establishment latency increases
as the threshold value increases. For instance, in a network with 40 nodes, the735
latency of key establishment is 39.2 sec at the threshold value of 6, while it is
51.9 sec at the threshold value of 12.
Furthermore, when the network size increases, the probability of a request
message being collided with another request message increases, since all of the
mesh routers compute their shares of the master private key almost at the740
same time, and thus, most of the mesh clients broadcast their master private
key share request messages simultaneously. This increases the utilization of
the adopted repeat request after timeout method. As a consequence, latency
of key establishment increases as the network size increases. For instance, at
the threshold level of 6, it takes 39.2 sec for 40 mesh nodes to compute their745
private keys, while it takes 66.4 sec when the network size is 100. Besides, at
the threshold value of 12, an increase in the number of mesh nodes from 40 to
100 increases the key establishment latency from 51.9 sec to 139.7 sec.
Although these latency values might seem high, one should note that the key
establishment procedure is performed only once. Besides, it is also important to750
note that the scenario of the measured key establishment latency involves all of
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the mesh clients to be deployed exactly at the same time. As discussed above,
the first cause of this high latency is the utilized repeat request after timeout
method, which gives rise to the increase in the packet drops due to packet
collisions. Therefore, if we were to deploy the mesh clients fragmentarily, the755
key establishment latency would be lower since the packet collisions would be
diminished. In this way, we can achieve higher threshold values needed to thwart
against heavy node capture attacks discussed in Section 4.
6.2. Success Percentage of User Private Key
Generation760
We evaluated the success percentage of user private key generation, i.e., the
number of mesh nodes that are capable of computing their own private keys
over the network size, for different values of both the network size, n, and the
threshold value, k. Figure 5 shows the corresponding results.
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Figure 5: Success Percentage of User Private Key Generation in DKEM
In the last phase of DKEM, mesh routers can compute their own private765
keys if and only if they receive at least (k − x) user private key shares, as
discussed in Section 2.2.3, where x is the number of shares that a mesh router
holds. Likewise, mesh clients should receive (k−y) user private key shares for the
proper construction of their own private keys, where y is the number of shares
that a mesh client holds. However, a request receiving mesh node can provide770
the private key share(s) of a requesting mesh node if and only if it has already
computed its share(s) of the master private key. Therefore, success percentage
36
of user private key generation actually depends on the number of neighboring
nodes that have already computed their master private key shares.
When the threshold value increases, the probability of a mesh node comput-775
ing its master private key share decreases, since the received partial shares will
not be sufficient for the corresponding construction process. Accordingly, for a
specific mesh node, the number of neighbors that have already computed their
master private key shares decreases. This results in a decrease in the number
of shares received by a mesh node sending request to compute its own private780
key. Hence, an increase in the threshold value decreases the success percent-
age of user private key generation. Results show that, in a network with 40
nodes, while 99% of the mesh nodes can compute their own private keys when
the threshold value is 6, at least 91% of them can perform the corresponding
construction successfully when it is 12, and the success percentage is 87% at the785
threshold value of 16.
Besides, when the network size increases, the number of neighboring nodes
increases. Consequently, the probability of a mesh client being able to compute
its master private key share also increases, due to the increase in the number of
accessible partial shares. As a result, for a specific mesh node, the number of790
neighbors that have already computed their master private key shares increases.
This results in an increase in the number of user private key shares received by
a requesting mesh node. Hence, an increase in the network size increases the
success percentage of user private key generation. Results show that, at the
threshold value of 12, at least 91% of the mesh nodes can compute their own795
private keys when the network size is 40, while at least 93% of them can per-
form the corresponding construction successfully when it is 60, and the success
percentage is 97% when the network size is 100.
6.3. Comparison with the Baseline Protocol
We adapted the baseline protocol to WMNs in order to have a proper com-800
parison with our DKEM solution. As described in Section 1.2, in the baseline
protocol, the master key of the network is generated with the collaboration of
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all the users. Hence, in the baseline protocol, the first phase of DKEM, in which
the master private key shares are generated, is executed by all of the mesh nodes.
Since there is no other mesh node left to compute its master private key share,805
the second phase of DKEM is not included in the baseline protocol. However,
different from DKEM, in the baseline protocol, mesh nodes also compute the
shares of the master public key, publish them and reconstruct the corresponding
public key. Finally, they execute the last phase of DKEM (except for the com-
putations related to the additional share of the master private key) to compute810
their own private keys. It is important to note that in the baseline protocol
each node holds only one share of the master private key.
Figure 6 shows DKEM key establishment latency speed-up as compared to
the baseline protocol, which is defined as the ratio of the key establishment
latency of the baseline protcol to the key establishment latency of DKEM, i.e.,815
Key Establishment Latency of the Baseline Protocol
Key Establishment Latency of DKEM . As discussed in Section 6.1, an
increase in either the threshold value or the network size also increases the uti-
lization of the introduced repeat request after timeout method. This, in turn,
increases the latency of key establishment. In the baseline protocol, after com-
puting their shares of the master private key, mesh nodes compute their master820
public key shares and publish them, as mentioned above. This increases the
use of the adopted repeat request after timeout method considerably, even more
than that of DKEM.
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Figure 6: DKEM Key Establishment Latency Speed-up as Compared to the
Baseline Protocol - This is the ratio of the key establishment latency of the
baseline protocol to the key establishment latency of DKEM
38
When compared with DKEM, in the baseline protocol, it takes much longer
for the final mesh node to finish computing its own private key. For instance,
in a network with 40 nodes operating at the threshold value of 6, the key estab-825
lishment latency is approximately 39 sec in DKEM, while it is approximately
266 sec in the baseline protocol, which is approximately 6.8 fold of DKEM’s
latency. When the network size is 40, as we increase the threshold value from 6
to 8, the latency of key establishment becomes approximately 41 sec in DKEM,
while it becomes approximately 8.6 fold of that value, which is 353 sec, in the830
baseline protocol. Besides, at the threshold level of 6, when we increase the net-
work size from 40 to 60, the key establishment latency becomes approximately
50 sec in DKEM, while it becomes approximately 1234 sec in the baseline proto-
col, which is approximately 25 fold of DKEM’s latency. In fact, in the baseline
protocol, we cannot further increase either the network size over 60 nodes or835
the threshold value over 12; the increase observed in the latency of key estab-
lishment is so excessive that the protocol becomes inapplicable. Nevertheless,
the least elapsed time observed in the baseline protocol, which is approximately
266 sec (n = 40, k = 6), is higher than the highest elapsed time of DKEM, which
is approximately 206 sec (n = 100, k = 16). Hence, we can conclude that the840
key establishment latency of DKEM outperforms the key establishment latency
of the baseline protocol.
On the other hand, Figure 7 shows the success percentage of user private key
generation of the baseline protocol. As discussed in Section 6.2, the correspond-
ing ratio depends on the number of the mesh nodes that have already computed845
their master private key shares. However, in the baseline protocol, the shares
of the master private key are generated with the contribution of all the mesh
nodes. At the end of the first phase, all of the mesh nodes finish computing
these shares. Therefore, in the baseline protocol, this ratio depends only on the
number of neighboring nodes. Consequently, the success percentage increases850
when either the threshold value decreases or the network size increases.
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Figure 7: Success Percentage of User Private Key Generation in the Baseline
Protocol
As compared with DKEM, the number of the mesh nodes that can construct
their own private keys is fewer in the baseline protocol. For instance, in a net-
work with 40 nodes operating at the threshold value of 10, success percentage of
user private key generation is approximately 93% in DKEM, while it is approxi-855
mately 69% in the baseline protocol. When the network size is 40, as we increase
the threshold value from 10 to 12, the success rate becomes approximately 91%
in DKEM, while it becomes approximately 53% in the baseline protocol. Be-
sides, at the threshold level of 10, when we increase the network size from 40 to
60, the success percentages of user private key generation become approximately860
95% and 93% in DKEM and in the baseline protocol, respectively. Hence, we
can conclude that the successful user private key generation rate of DKEM out-
performs the successful user private key generation rate of the baseline protocol
as the threshold value goes beyond 6.
7. Conclusions865
WMNs are one of the important research areas that provide low-cost and
high-speed network services for the end users. As in all types of wireless net-
works, key management is their most important and critical security concern.
Unfortunately, the conventional solutions for the key establishment problem
do not fit in the unique characteristics of WMNs, i.e., being dynamically self-870
organized, self-configured and self-healing.
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In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure distributed key establish-
ment protocol that is specifically designed for WMNs. Our scheme makes use of
EC-IBC, which decreases both the computation necessary to join the network
and the bandwidth consumed within the network by eliminating the necessity875
of the certificate-based public key distribution. Moreover, the problems arising
from the TTP assumption of the EC-IBC constructions are eliminated using
ThSS, through which the trusted authority is eliminated via collaborative gen-
eration of the shared secrets. In fact, due to the assumption of not having mutual
trust among the mesh nodes, we need to use a verifiable ThSS construction [43].880
However, we implemented DKEM without considering this requirement. If we
were to use a verifiable ThSS, then the key establishment latency would be
higher, but the success percentage of user private key generation would not be
affected.
In our solution, we utilize a variant of Shamir’s threshold secret sharing.885
Since the mesh routers can be distinguished from the mesh clients by both the
parameters they hold and the operations they perform, we can delegate the
master private key share generation process to the mesh routers. With this
construction, we can decrease the total number of nodes present in the mas-
ter private key share generation process, which decreases the communication890
and the computational complexities of the system, as compared to the base-
line protocol. Moreover, we assume that it is harder to compromise the mesh
routers than compromising the mesh clients. With this assumption, we can
both increase the number of shares required in the reconstruction processes by
increasing the number of shares that the mesh routers hold and enforce the con-895
tribution of a mesh router in the reconstruction operations. As a consequence,
the resiliency of the network can be increased without increasing the number of
required neighboring nodes.
We explored the security of both baseline protocol and DKEM. Our analysis
exposed that the baseline protocol is not secure against an insider semi-honest900
attacker. We showed that how an adversary can easily obtain the master private
shares of other nodes and more vitally can capture the master private key of the
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system. Thereafter, we proved that DKEM is secure against both outsider and
semi-honest insider adversaries in which the success probability of the attacker
is only negligible.905
We performed performance evaluation in order to show the effect of both the
threshold value and the network size on the latency of key establishment and
on the success percentage of user private key generation by using simulation.
Results show that an increase in the network size increases both the latency
of key establishment and the success percentage of user private key generation.910
For instance, at the threshold value of 8, an increase in the number of mesh
nodes from 40 to 100 results in 5% increase in the successful user private key
generation rate and 129% increase in the elapsed time. Our simulation results
also show that increasing the threshold value decreases the success percentage
of user private key generation and increases the key establishment latency. For915
instance, at the threshold value of 6, almost all of the mesh nodes can compute
their own private keys within at most 1 min regardless of the network size.
Moreover, for the worst case network scenario with 40 nodes performing at the
threshold level of 16, at least 87% of the mesh nodes can compute their private
keys within approximately 2.5 min. Hence, there is a trade-off between resiliency920
and efficiency: increasing the threshold value also increases the resiliency of
the network but negatively effects its efficiency (e.g., key establishment latency
increases and success percentage of user private key generation decreases).
Finally, we also simulated the baseline protocol. Results show that DKEM
outperforms the baseline protocol when either latency of key establishment,925
success percentage of user private key generation or network resiliency is of
concern. In conclusion, DKEM is much more efficient than the baseline protocol
in all performance metrics.
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Appendix A. An Example Network
We present below a simple WMN setting in order to provide an illustration
of our DKEM protocol. During descriptions and explanations of the protocol,1115
we use the example network setting depicted in Figure A.8, which consists of 2
mesh routers and 2 mesh clients. In this setting, mesh routers M1 and M2 are in
the communication ranges of each other, mesh client C3 is in the communication
range of all the other mesh nodes, and mesh client C4 is in the communication
ranges of mesh router M1 and mesh client C3. For the sake of easy reading,1120
in the example, each mesh router holds 2 master private key shares, each mesh
client holds 1 master private key share and the threshold value is 4. However,
note that due to the security reasons, a client should hold at least 2 master
private key shares to be able to help the other clients (see Section 3).
M1 M2
C3
C4
Communication Ranges
M1
M2
C3
C4
Figure A.8: An Example Network Model
Appendix A.1. Master private key share generation phase1125
Figure A.9 depicts an example for the master private key share generation
phase of DKEM. After computing the subshares of the master private key, mesh
routers M1 and M2 exchange these subshares with each other. When they
receive all of their missing data, they compute their shares of the master private
key and broadcast the FINISH message.1130
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Figure A.9: An Instance for the Master Private Key Share Generation Phase
of DKEM - Figure A.8 depicts the corresponding network model, the number
of shares that a mesh router holds is 2 (i.e., x = 2), and the dashed lines
represent broadcast messages while the solid lines represent unicast messages.
Appendix A.2. Master private key share distribution phase
Figure A.10 depicts an example for the master private key share distribution
phase of DKEM. After receiving a FINISH message from one of its neighbors,
mesh client C4 broadcasts a request message on its master private key share.
This request message is received by mesh router M1 and mesh client C3. Since1135
mesh client C3 has not computed its share of the master private key yet, it
saves this request. On the other hand, mesh router M1 has already computed
its shares of the master private key; thus, it replies to the request of the mesh
client C4 indicating that it can contribute to the distribution process with 2
partial shares. Then, mesh client C3 also recognizes the end of the first phase1140
and broadcasts a request message on its master private key share. This request
message is received by all of the mesh nodes. Mesh client C4 saves this request
because it cannot send an immediate reply. However, having computed their
master private key shares, mesh routers M1 and M2 reply to the request of the
mesh client C3 indicating that they can contribute to the distribution process1145
with 2 partial shares. At this point, mesh client C3 knows that it can receive 4
partial shares of the master private key; therefore, it broadcasts another request
message indicating that the contribution of the mesh routers M1 and M2 are
required.
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Figure A.10: An Instance for the Master Private Key Share Distribution Phase
of DKEM - Figure A.8 depicts the corresponding network model, the number
of shares that a mesh router holds is 2 (i.e., x = 2), the number of shares that
a mesh client holds is 1 (i.e., y = 1), the threshold value is 4 (i.e., k = 4), and
the dashed lines represent broadcast messages while the solid lines represent
unicast messages.
This second request message is also received by all of the mesh nodes. Upon1150
receipt, mesh client C4 discards the first request message of the mesh client
C3 that it has previously saved to respond after computing its master private
key share, since its contribution is not required anymore. On the other hand,
mesh routers M1 and M2 compute the partial shares of the mesh client C3 and
transmit them. As soon as mesh client C3 receives the required partial shares, it1155
computes its master private key share. Thereafter, mesh client C3 replies to the
request of the mesh client C4, which it has previously saved, indicating that it
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can contribute to the distribution process with 1 partial share. Unfortunately,
mesh client C4 cannot compute its share of the master private key because of
the fact that it can receive only 3 master private key partial shares from its1160
neighbors.
Appendix A.3. User private key generation phase
Figure A.11 illustrates an example scenario for the user private key genera-
tion phase of DKEM. After computing its share of the master private key, mesh
client C3 broadcasts a request message on the generation of its own private key.1165
This request message is received by all the other mesh nodes. Having computed
their shares of the master private key, mesh routers M1 and M2 respond to this
request indicating that they can contribute with 2 shares. At this point, mesh
client C3 knows that it can receive 3 shares of its own private key and the ad-
ditional share. Thus, it broadcasts another request message indicating that the1170
contribution of the mesh router M1 with 2 shares along with the additive share
and the mesh router M2 with 1 share are required. This second request message
is also received by all of the mesh nodes. Upon receipt, mesh routers M1 and
M2 compute the corresponding shares and transmit them to the mesh client C3.
Finally, after receiving all the required data, mesh client C3 constructs its user1175
private key.
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Figure A.11: An Instance for the User Private Key Generation Phase of DKEM
- Figure A.8 depicts the corresponding network model, the number of shares
that a mesh router holds is 2 (i.e., x = 2), the number of shares that a mesh
client holds is 1 (i.e., y = 1), the threshold value is 4 (i.e., k = 4), and
the dashed lines represent broadcast messages while the solid lines represent
unicast messages.
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